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Abstract. We present three natural but distinct formalisations of Einstein’s special
principle of relativity, and demonstrate the relationships between them. In particular, we
prove that they are logically distinct, but that they can be made equivalent by introducing
a small number of additional, intuitively acceptable axioms.
§1. Introduction The special principle of relativity (SPR), which states that
the laws of physics should be the same in all inertial frames, has been foundational
to physical thinking since the time of Galileo, and gained renewed prominence as
Einstein’s first postulate of relativity theory (Einstein, 1916, §1):
If a system of coordinates K is chosen so that, in relation to it,
physical laws hold good in their simplest form, the same laws hold
good in relation to any other system of coordinates K’ moving
in uniform translation relatively to K. This postulate we call the
“special principle of relativity.”
Despite its foundational status, the special principle of relativity remains prob-
lematic due to its inherent ambiguity (Szabo´, 2004; Go¨mo¨ri & Szabo´, 2013a,b).
What, after all, do we mean by “physical laws”, and what does it mean to say that
the “same laws” hold in two different frames?
These ambiguities often lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the
principle. See, e.g., Muller (1992) for the resolution of one such misinterpretation.
We believe that formalisation is the best way to eliminate these ambiguities. In
this paper we investigate the principle of relativity in an axiomatic framework of
mathematical logic. However, we will introduce not one but three different naturally
arising versions of the principle of relativity, not counting the parameters on which
they depend, such as the formal language of the framework used.
It is not so surprising, when one tries to capture SPR formally, that more than one
“natural” version offers itself – not only was Einstein’s description of his principle
given only informally, but its roots reach back to Galileo’s even less formal “ship
story” (Galileo, 1953, pp. 186–187).
Since all three of the versions we investigate are “natural”, and simply reflect
different approaches to capturing the original idea, there is no point trying to decide
which is the “authentic” formalisation. The best thing we can do is to investigate
how the different formalisations are related to each other. Therefore, in this paper
we investigate under which assumptions these formalisations become equivalent.
c© Association for Symbolic Logic
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Fig. 1. Counter-examples and implications requiring no additional axioms.
In a different framework but with similar motivations, Go¨mo¨ri and Szabo´ also
introduce several formalisations of Einstein’s ideas (Szabo´, 2004; Go¨mo¨ri & Szabo´,
2013a,b; Go¨mo¨ri, 2015). Intuitively, what they refer to as “covariance” corresponds
to our principles of relativity and what they call the principle of relativity is an
even stronger assumption. However, justifying this intuition is beyond the scope
of this paper, as it would require us to develop a joint framework in which both
approaches can faithfully be interpreted.
1.1. Contribution In this paper we present three logical interpretations (SPRM,
SPR+ and SPRB ,IOb) of the relativity principle, and investigate the extent to which
they are equivalent. We find that the three formalisations are logically distinct,
although they can be rendered equivalent by the introduction of additional axioms.
We prove rigorously the following relationships.
1.1.1. Counter-examples and implications requiring no additional axioms (Fig. 1)
• SPR+ 6=⇒ SPRM (Thm. 7.1.)
• SPRB ,IOb 6=⇒ SPRM (Thm. 7.1.)
• SPRB ,IOb 6=⇒ SPR
+ (Thm. 7.1.)
• SPRM =⇒ SPR
+ (Thm. 7.2.)
• SPRM =⇒ SPRB ,IOb (Thm. 7.3.)
1.1.2. Adding axioms to make the different formalisations equivalent (Fig. 2)
• SPR+ =⇒ SPRB ,IOb assuming AxId, AxEv, AxIB, AxField (Thm. 7.4.)
• SPRB ,IOb =⇒ SPRM assuming L = L0, AxEv, AxExt (Thm. 7.7.)
• SPR+ =⇒ SPRM assuming L = L0, AxId, AxIB, AxField, AxEv, AxExt (Thms.
7.4., 7.7.)
• SPRB ,IOb =⇒ SPR
+ assuming L = L0, AxEv, AxExt (Thms. 7.2., 7.7.)
1.1.3. SPRM, SPR
+ and the decomposition of SPRB ,IOb into SPRIOb and SPRB
(Fig. 3)
• SPR+ =⇒ SPRIOb assuming AxId, AxEv (Thm. 7.5.)
• SPR+ =⇒ SPRB assuming AxIB, AxField (Thm. 7.6.)
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Fig. 3. SPRM, SPR
+ and the decomposition of SPRB ,IOb into SPRIOb and SPRB .
Outline of the paper. We begin in §2. by characterising what we mean by a
“law of nature” in our first-order logic framework. Rather than going into all the
difficulties of defining what a law of nature is, we focus instead on the requirement
that all inertial observers must agree as to the outcomes of experimental scenarios
described by such a law. In §3. we give some examples, in §4. we demonstrate our
three formalisations of SPR, in §5. we discuss the types of models our language
admits, and in §6. we state the axioms that will be relevant to our results. These
results are stated formally in §7. In §8. we discuss some alternative assumptions
to axiom AxIB. The proofs of the theorems can be found in §9. We conclude with
a discussion of our findings in §10., where we also highlight questions requiring
further investigation.
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§2. Laws of Nature Before turning our attention towards formalising the
principle of relativity, we need to present the framework in which our logical
formalisms will be expressed. Following the approach described in (Andre´ka et al.,
2007; Andre´ka et al., 2011), we will use the first-order logical (FOL) 3-sorted lan-
guage
L0 = {IOb,B ,Q , 0, 1,+, ·,W}
as a core language for kinematics. In this language
• IOb is the sort of inertial observers (for labeling coordinate systems);
• B is the sort of bodies, i.e. things that move;
• Q is the sort of quantities, i.e. numbers, with constants 0 and 1, addition (+)
and multiplication (·);
• W is the worldview relation, a 6-ary relation of type IOb × B ×Q4.
The statement W(k, b, p) represents the idea that “inertial observer k coordi-
natises body b to be at spacetime location p.”
Throughout this paper we use h, k and their variants to represent inertial ob-
servers (variables of sort IOb); we use b and c to represent bodies (variables of sort
B); and p, q and r are variables of type Q4. The sorts of other variables will be
clear from context.
Given this foundation, various derived notions can be defined:
• The event observed by k ∈ IOb as occurring at p ∈ Q4 is the set of bodies
that k coordinatises to be at p:
evk(p) ≡ {b ∈ B : W(k, b, p)}.
• For each k, h ∈ IOb, the worldview transformation wkh is a binary relation
on Q4 which captures the idea that h coordinatises at q ∈ Q4 the same event
that k coordinatises at p ∈ Q4:
wkh(p, q) ≡ [evk(p) = evh(q)]. (w.def)
• The worldline of b ∈ B as observed by k ∈ IOb is the set of locations p ∈ Q4
at which k coordinatises b:
wlinek(b) ≡ {p : W(k, b, p)}.
We try to choose our primitive notions as simple and “observationally oriented”
as possible, cf. Friedman (1983, p.31). Therefore the set of events is not primitive,
but rather a defined concept, i.e. an event is a set of bodies that an observer observes
at a certain point of its coordinate system. Motivation for such a definition of event
goes back to Einstein and can be found in Misner et al. (1973, p.6) and Einstein
(1996, p.153).
Since laws of nature stand or fall according to the outcomes of physical exper-
iments, we next consider statements, φ, which describe experimental claims. For
example, φ might say “if this equipment has some specified configuration today,
then it will have some expected new configuration tomorrow”. This is very much
a dynamic process-oriented description of experimentation, but since we are using
the language of spacetime, the entire experiment can be described as a static four-
dimensional configuration of matter in time and space. We therefore introduce the
concept of scenarios, i.e. sentences describing both the initial conditions and the
ZU064-05-FPR mss-SPR 13 March 2018 17:0
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outcomes of experiments. Although our scenarios are primarily intended to capture
experimental configurations and outcomes, they can also describe more complex
situations, as illustrated by the examples in §3. One of our formalisations of SPR
will be the assertion that all inertial observers agree as to whether or not certain
situations are realizable. Our definition of scenarios is motivated by the desire to
have a suitably large set of sentences describing these situations.
To introduce scenarios formally, let us fix a language L containing our core
language L0. We will say that a formula
φ ≡ φ(k, x¯) ≡ φ(k, x1, x2, x3, . . . )
of language L describes a scenario provided it has a single free variable k of sort
IOb (to allow us to evaluate the scenario for different observers), and none of sort
B . The other free variables x1, . . . can be thought of as experimental parameters,
allowing us to express such statements as φ(k, v) ≡ “k can see some body b moving
with speed v”. Notice that numerical variables (in this case v) can sensibly be
included as free variables here, but bodies cannot – if we allow the use of specific
individuals (Thomas, say) we can obtain formulae (“k can see Thomas moving with
speed v”) which manifestly violate SPR, since we cannot expect all observers k to
agree on such an assertion. The truth values of certain formulas containing bodies
as free variables can happen to be independent of inertial observers, for example
ν2 in §3., but we prefer to treat these as exceptional cases to be proven from the
principle of relativity and the rest of the axioms.
Thus φ ≡ φ(k, x¯) represents a scenario provided
• k is free in φ(k, x¯),
• k is the only free variable of sort IOb,
• the free variables xi are of sort Q (or any other sort of L representing
mathematical objects), and
• there is no free variable of sort B (or any other sort of L representing physical
objects).
The set of all scenarios will be denoted by Scenarios.
Finally, for any formula φ(k, x¯) with free variables k of sort IOb and x1, x2, . . .
of any sorts, the formula
AllAgree〈φ〉 ≡ (∀k, h ∈ IOb)
(
(∀x¯)[φ(k, x¯)↔ φ(h, x¯)]
)
captures the idea that for every evaluation of the free variables x¯ all inertial
observers agree on the truth value of φ. Let us note that AllAgree〈〉 is defined
not just for scenarios, e.g., it is defined for the non-scenario examples of §3., too.
In §4., one of the formalisations of SPR will be that AllAgree〈φ〉 holds for every
possible scenario φ.
§3. Examples Here we give examples for both scenarios and non-scenarios. To
be able to show interesting examples beyond the core language used in this paper,
let us expand our language with a unary relation Ph of light signals (photons) of
type B and a function M : B → Q for rest mass, i.e. M(b) is the rest mass of body
b. For illustrative purposes we focus in particular on inertial bodies, i.e. bodies
moving with uniform linear motion, and introduce the notations speedk(b) = v and
velk(b) = (v1, v2, v3) to indicate that b is an inertial body moving with speed v ∈ Q
ZU064-05-FPR mss-SPR 13 March 2018 17:0
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and velocity (v1, v2, v3) ∈ Q
3 according to inertial observer k. These notions can
be easily defined assuming AxField introduced in §6., and their definitions can be
found, e.g., in Andre´ka et al. (2008); Madara´sz et al. (2014).
In the informal explanations of the examples below we freely use such modal ex-
pressions as “can set down” and “can send out”, in place of “coordinatise”, to make
the experimental idea behind scenarios intuitively clearer, and to illustrate how the
dynamical aspects of making experiments are captured in our static framework.
See also (Molna´r & Sze´kely, 2015) for a framework where the distinction between
actual and potential bodies is elaborated within first-order modal logic.
Examples for scenarios:
• Inertial observer k can set down a body at spacetime location (0, 0, 0, 0):
φ1(k) ≡ (∃b)W(k, b, 0, 0, 0, 0).
• Inertial observer k can send out an inertial body with speed v:
φ2(k, v) ≡ (∃b)speedk(b) = v.
• Inertial observer k can send out an inertial body at location (x1, x2, x3, x4)
with velocity (v1, v2, v3) and rest mass m:
φ3(k, x1, x2, x3, x4, v1, v2, v3,m) ≡
(∃b)[W (k, b, x1, x2, x3, x4) ∧ velk(b) = (v1, v2, v3) ∧M(b) = m].
.
• The speed of every light signal is v according to inertial observer k:
φ4(k, v) ≡ (∀b)[Ph(b)→ speedk(b) = v].
Let us consider scenario φ4 to illustrate that AllAgree〈φ〉 means that all inertial
observers agree on the truth value of φ for every evaluation of the free vari-
ables x¯. Assume that the speed of light is 1 for every inertial observer, i.e. that
(∀k)(∀b)[Ph(b)→ speedk(b) = 1]∧ (∃b)Ph(b) holds. Then the truth value of φ4(k, 1)
is true for every inertial observer k, but the truth value of φ4(k, a) is false for every
inertial observer k if a 6= 1. Thus AllAgree〈φ4〉 holds.
Examples for non-scenarios:
• The speed of inertial body b according to inertial observer k is v:
ν1(k, v, b) ≡ speedk(b) = v.
Then AllAgree〈ν1〉 means that all inertial observers agree on the speed of each
body. Obviously, we do not want such statements to hold.
Notice, incidentally, that it is possible for all observers to agree as to the truth
value of a non-scenario, but this is generally something we need to prove, rather
than assert a priori. For example, consider the non-scenario:
• The speed of light signal b is v according to inertial observer k:
ν2(k, v, b) ≡ Ph(b)→ speedk(b) = v.
Then AllAgree〈ν2〉 means that all inertial observers agree on the speed of each
light signal, and it happens to follow from AllAgree〈φ4〉, where scenario φ4 is given
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above. Therefore, AllAgree〈ν2〉 will follow from our formalisations of SPR which
entail the truth of formula AllAgree〈φ4〉.
While different observers agree on the speed of any given photon in special
relativity theory, they do not agree as to its direction of motion, which is captured
by the following non-scenario:
• The velocity of light signal b is (v1, v2, v3) according to inertial observer k:
ν3(k, v1, v2, v3, b) ≡ Ph(b)→ velk(b) = (v1, v2, v3).
Then AllAgree〈ν3〉 means that all inertial observers agree on the velocity of each
light signal, and once again we do not want such a formula to hold.
§4. Three formalisations of SPR
First formalisation. A natural interpretation of the special principle is to identify
a set S of scenarios on which all inertial observers should agree (i.e. those scenarios
we consider to be experimentally relevant). If we now define
SPR(S) ≡ {AllAgree〈φ〉 : φ ∈ S}, (1.S)
the principle of relativity becomes the statement that every formula in SPR(S)
holds. For example, if we assume that all inertial observers agree on all scenarios,
and define
SPR+ ≡ {AllAgree〈φ〉 : φ ∈ Scenarios}, (1.+)
then we get a “strongest possible” version of SPR(S) formulated in the language L.
It is important to note that the power of SPR(S) (and hence that of SPR+)
strongly depends on which language L we use. It matters, for example, whether
we can only use L to express scenarios related to kinematics, or whether we can
also discuss particle dynamics, electrodynamics, etc. The more expressive L is, the
stronger the corresponding principle becomes.
Second formalisation. A natural indirect approach is to assume that the world-
views of any two inertial observers are identical. In other words, given any model M
of our language L, and given any observers k and h, we can find an automorphism
of the model which maps k to h, while leaving all quantities (and elements of all
the other sorts of L representing mathematical objects) fixed. That is, if the only
sort of L representing mathematical objects is Q , we require the statement
SPRM ≡ (∀k, h ∈ IOb)(∃α ∈ Aut(M))[α(k) = h ∧ α↾Q = IdQ] (2)
to hold, where IdQ is the identity function on Q , and α↾Q denotes the restriction of
α to the quantity part of the model. If L has other sorts representing mathematical
objects than Q , then in (2) we also require α↾U = IdU to hold for any such sort U .
Third formalisation. Another way to characterise the special principle of rela-
tivity is to assume that all inertial observers agree as to how they stand in relation
to bodies and each other (see Fig. 4). In other words, we require the formulae
SPRB ≡ (∀k, k
′)(∀b)(∃b′)[wlinek(b) = wlinek′ (b
′)] (3.B)
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and
SPRIOb ≡ (∀k, k
′)(∀h)(∃h′)[wkh = wk′h′ ] (3.IOb)
to be satisfied. We will use the following notation:
SPRB ,IOb = {SPRB , SPRIOb}.
SPRB ,IOb is only a “tiny kinematic slice” of SPR. It says that two inertial
observers are indistinguishable by possible world-lines and by their relation to other
observers.
PSfrag replacements
∀k
∀h
∀k′
∃h′
∀b ∃b′
wkh wk′h′
Fig. 4. Illustration for SPRB and SPRIOb .
§5. Models satisfying SPR According to Theorems 7.2. and 7.3. below,
SPRM is the strongest of our three formalisations of the relativity principle, since
it implies the other two without any need for further assumptions.
The ‘standard’ model of special relativity satisfies SPRM and therefore also SPR
+
and SPRB ,IOb , where by the ‘standard’ model we mean a model determined up to
isomorphisms by the following properties: (a) the structure of quantities is isomor-
phic to that of real numbers; (b) all the worldview transformations are Poincare´
transformations; (c) for every inertial observer k and Poincare´ transformation P ,
there is another observer h, such that wkh = P ; (d) bodies can move exactly on the
smooth timelike and lightlike curves; and (e) worldlines uniquely determine bodies
and worldviews uniquely determine inertial observers.
In fact, there are several models satisfying SPRM in the literature, and these
models also ensure that the axioms used in this paper are mutually consistent.
Indeed, in (Sze´kely, 2013; Andre´ka et al., 2014; Madara´sz & Sze´kely, 2014) we have
demonstrated several extensions of the ‘standard’ model of special relativity which
satisfy SPRM. Applying the methods used in those papers, it is not difficult to show
that SPRM is also consistent with classical kinematics. Again, this is not surprising
as there are several papers in the literature showing that certain formalisations
of the principle of relativity cannot distinguish between classical and relativistic
kinematics, and as Ignatowski (1910, 1911) has shown, when taken together with
other assumptions, SPR implies that the group of transformations between inertial
observers can only be the Poincare´ group or the inhomogeneous Galilean group.
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Fig. 5. Schematic representation of AxId: If k and h agree as to what’s happening
at each of the 5 principal locations, then they agree as to what’s happening at every
location p.
For further developments of this theme, see (Le´vy-Leblond, 1976; Borisov, 1978;
Pal, 2003; Pelissetto & Testa, 2015).
The simplest way to get to special relativity from SPRM is to extend the lan-
guage L0 with light signals and assume Einstein’s light postulate, i.e. light signals
move with the same speed in every direction with respect to at least one inertial
observer. Then, by SPRM, AxPh follows, i.e. light signals move with the same speed
in every direction according to every inertial observer. AxPh, even without any
principle of relativity, implies (using only some trivial auxiliary assumptions such
as AxEv (see p. 9)), that the transformations between inertial observers are Poincare´
transformations; see, e.g., (Andre´ka et al., 2011, Thm.2.2).
It is worth noting that SPRM also admits models which extend the ‘standard’
model of special relativity, for example models containing faster-than-light bodies
which can interact dynamically with one another (Sze´kely, 2013; Andre´ka et al.,
2014; Madara´sz & Sze´kely, 2014).
§6. Axioms We now define various auxiliary axioms. As we show below, whether
or not two formalisations of SPR are equivalent depends to some extent on which
of these axioms one considers to be valid.
In these axioms, the spacetime origin is the point e0 = (0, 0, 0, 0), and the unit
points along each axis are defined by e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0), e2 = (0, 1, 0, 0), e3 = (0, 0, 1, 0)
and e4 = (0, 0, 0, 1). We call e0, . . . , e4 the principal locations.
AxEv All observers agree as to what can be observed. If k can observe an event
somewhere, then h must also be able to observe that event somewhere:
(∀k, h)(∀p)(∃q)[evk(p) = evh(q)].
AxId If k and h agree as to what’s happening at each of the 5 principal locations,
then they agree as to what’s happening everywhere (see Fig. 5):
(∀k, h)
(
(∀i ∈ {0, . . . , 4})[evk(ei) = evh(ei)]→ (∀p)[evk(p) = evh(p)]
)
.
We can think of this axiom as a generalised form of the assertion that all
worldview transformations are affine transformations.
AxExtIOb If two inertial observers coordinatise exactly the same events at every
possible location, they are actually the same observer:
(∀k, h)
(
(∀p)[evk(p) = evh(p)]→ k = h
)
.
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AxExtB If two bodies have the same worldline (as observed by any observer k),
then they are actually the same body:
(∀k)(∀b, b′)[wlinek(b) = wlinek(b
′)→ b = b′].
AxExt We write this as shorthand for AxExtB ∧ AxExtIOb.
AxField (Q , 0, 1,+, ·) satisfies the most fundamental properties of R, i.e. it is a
field (in the sense of abstract algebra; see, e.g., (Stewart, 2009)).
Notice that we do not assume a priori that Q is the field R of real numbers,
because we do not know and cannot determine experimentally whether the structure
of quantities in the real world is isomorphic to that of R. Moreover, using arbitrary
fields makes our findings more general.
AxIB All bodies (considered) are inertial, i.e. their worldlines are straight lines
according to every inertial observer:
(∀k)(∀b)(∃p, q)[q 6= e0 ∧ wlinek(b) = {p+ λq : λ ∈ Q}].
AxIB is a strong assumption. In section §8., we introduce generalisations of AxIB
allowing accelerated bodies, too. We choose to include AxIB in our main theorems
because it is arguably the simplest and clearest of these generalisations. The main
generalisation wlDefM of AxIB is a meta-assumption and the others are quite
technical assertions which are easier to understand in relation to AxIB.
§7. Results IfM is some model for a FOL language L, and Σ is some collection
of logical formulae in that language, we write M  Σ to mean that every σ ∈ Σ
is valid when interpreted within M. If Σ1,Σ2 are both collections of formulae, we
write Σ1  Σ2 to mean that
M  Σ2 whenever M  Σ1
holds for every model M of L. For a general introduction to logical models, see
(Mendelson, 2015; Marker, 2002).
Theorem 7.1. demonstrates that our three formalisations of the principle of
relativity are logically distinct. It is worth noting that based on the ideas used in
the proof of Theorem 7.1. it is also easy to construct sophisticated counterexamples
to their equivalence extending the ‘standard’ model of special relativity.
Theorem 7.1. The formalisations SPRM, SPR
+ and SPRB ,IOb are logically dis-
tinct:
• M  SPR+ 6=⇒ SPRM. 
• M  SPRB ,IOb 6=⇒ SPRM. 
• M  SPRB ,IOb 6=⇒ M  SPR
+. 
By Theorems 7.2. and 7.3., SPRM is the strongest version of the three formali-
sations since it implies the other two without any extra assumptions.
Theorem 7.2. SPRM =⇒M  SPR
+. 
Theorem 7.3. SPRM =⇒M  SPRB ,IOb. 
Theorem 7.4. tells us that SPR+ can be made as powerful as SPRB ,IOb by adding
additional axioms. This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5. and 7.6.
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Theorem 7.4. SPR+ ∪ {AxId,AxEv,AxIB,AxField}  SPRB ,IOb . 
Theorem 7.5. There exist scenarios ψ, ψ˜ such that SPR(ψ, ψ˜) ∪ {AxId,AxEv} 
SPRIOb . 
Theorem 7.6. There exists a scenario ξ such that SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxIB,AxField} 
SPRB . 
Theorem 7.7. tells us that equipping SPRB ,IOb with additional axioms allows us
to recapture the power of SPRM (and hence, by Theorem 7.2., SPR
+).
Theorem 7.7. Assume L = L0. Then M  SPRB ,IOb ∪ {AxEv,AxExt} =⇒
SPRM. 
Thus, although SPRM, SPRB ,IOb and SPR
+ are logically distinct, they become
equivalent in the presence of suitable auxiliary axioms.
§8. Alternatives to AxIB In this section, we generalise AxIB to allow discus-
sion of accelerated bodies.
For every model M we formulate a property which says that world-lines are
parametrically definable subsets of Q4, where the parameters can be chosen only
from Q . For the definitions, cf. (Marker, 2002, §1.1.6, §1.2.1).
wlDefM For any k ∈ IOb and b ∈ B there is a formula ϕ(y1, y2, y3, y4, x1, . . . , xn),
where all the free variables y1, y2, y3, y4, x1, . . . , xn of ϕ are of sort Q , and there
is a¯ ∈ Qn such that wlinek(b) ≡ {q ∈ Q
4 : M  ϕ(q, a¯)}.
We note that plenty of curves in Q4 are definable in the sense above, e.g. curves
which can be defined by polynomial functions, as well as the worldlines of uniformly
accelerated bodies in both special relativity and Newtonian kinematics.
In general, not every accelerated worldline is definable – indeed, the set of curves
which are definable depends both on the language and the model. For example,
uniform circular motion is undefinable in many models; however, if we extend the
language with the sine function as a primitive notion and assert its basic proper-
ties by including the appropriate axioms, then uniform circular motion becomes
definable.
By Theorems 8.8. and 8.9., assumptions AxIB and AxField can be replaced by
wlDefM in Theorem 7.4. (Theorem 8.9. follows immediately from Theorems 7.5.
and 8.8.)
Theorem 8.8. (wlDefM and M  SPR
+) =⇒ M  SPRB . 
Theorem 8.9. (wlDefM and M  SPR
+ ∪ {AxId,AxEv}) =⇒ M  SPRB ,IOb. 
We note that M  {AxIB,AxField} =⇒ wlDefM. Moreover wlDefM is more
general than AxIB assuming AxField. The disadvantage of wlDefM is that it is not
an axiom, but a property of model M. We now introduce, for every natural number
n, an axiom AxWl(n) which is more general than AxIB assuming AxField and n ≥ 3,
and stronger than wlDefM.
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AxWl(n) Worldlines are determined by n distinct locations, i.e. if two worldlines
agree at n distinct locations, then they coincide:
(∀k, k′)(∀b, b′)
[(∃ distinct p1, . . . , pn ∈ wlinek(b) ∩ wlinek′(b
′)) → wlinek(b) = wlinek′ (b
′)].
We note that {AxIB,AxField}  AxWl(2 ), and AxWl(n)  AxWl(i) if i ≥ n.
Furthermore, for every n, we have M  AxWl(n) =⇒ wlDefM. To see that this
must be true, assume M  AxWl(n), choose k ∈ IOb and b ∈ B , let p1, . . . , pn ∈
wlinek(b) be distinct locations, and define
ϕ(y1, y2, y3, y4, x
1
1, x
1
2, x
1
3, x
1
4, . . . , x
n
1 , x
n
2 , x
n
3 , x
n
4 ) ≡
(∃h)(∃c)[(y1, y2, y3, y4), (x
1
1, x
1
2, x
1
3, x
1
4), . . . , (x
n
1 , x
n
2 , x
n
3 , x
n
4 ) ∈ wlineh(c)].
Then it is easy to see that wlinek(b) ≡ {q ∈ Q
4 : M  ϕ(q, p1, . . . , pn)}, whence
wlDefM holds, as claimed.
By Theorems 8.10. and 8.11., Theorems 7.4. and 7.6. remain true if we replace
AxIB and AxField with AxWl(n).
Theorem 8.10. SPR+ ∪ {AxId,AxEv,AxWl(n)}  SPRB ,IOb. 
Theorem 8.11. There is a scenario ξ such that SPR(ξ)∪{AxWl(n)}  SPRB . 
§9. Proofs We begin by proving a simple lemma which allows us to identify
when two observers are in fact the same observer. This lemma will prove useful in
several places below.
Lemma 9.12. {AxEv,AxExtIOb}  (∀k, h, h′)[(wkh = wkh′)→ h = h
′].
Proof. Suppose wkh = wkh′ , and choose any p ∈ Q
4. Let q ∈ Q4 satisfy evk(q) =
evh(p), so that wkh(q, p) holds (q exists by AxEv). Since wkh = wkh′ , it follows that
wkh′(q, p) also holds, so that evh(p) = evk(q) = evh′(p). This shows that h and h
′
see the same events at every p ∈ Q4, whence it follows by AxExtIOb that h = h′, as
claimed. 
Proof of Theorem 7.1. SPR+ 6=⇒ SPRM, SPRB ,IOb 6=⇒ SPRM, SPRB ,IOb 6=⇒
SPR+.
Constructing the required counterexamples in detail from scratch would be too
lengthy and technical, and would obscure the key ideas explaining why such models
exist. Accordingly, here we give only the ‘recipes’ on how to construct these models.
To prove that SPR+ does not imply SPRM, let M
− be any model satisfying
SPRM− and AxExt, and containing at least two inertial observers and a body b such
that the worldlines of b are distinct according to the two observers. Such models
exist, see, e.g., the ones constructed in Sze´kely (2013). The use of AxExt ensures
that distinct bodies have distinct worldlines. Let us now construct an extension M
of M− (violating AxExt) by adding uncountably-infinite many copies of body b, as
well as countably-infinite many copies of every other body. Clearly, M does not
satisfy SPRM, since this would require the existence of an automorphism taking a
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body having uncountably many copies to one having only countably many copies.
Nonetheless, M satisfies SPR+ since it can be elementarily extended to an even
larger model M+ satisfying SPRM+ (and hence, by Thm. 7.2., SPR
+) by increasing
the population of other bodies so that every body has an equal (uncountable)
number of copies (see (Madara´sz, 2002, Theorem 2.8.20)). Thus M satisfies SPR+
but not SPRM. In more detail: LetM
+ be an extension ofM obtained by increasing
the population of bodies so that every body has an equal (uncountable) number of
copies. We will use the Tarski-Vaught test (Marker, 2002, Prop.2.3.5, p.45) to show
that M+ is an elementary extension of M. Let φ(v, w1, . . . , wn) be a formula and
suppose a1, . . . , an in M and d
+ in M+ satisfy M+  φ(d+, a1, . . . , an). We have to
find a d inM such thatM+  φ(d, a1, . . . , an). If d
+ is not a body, then d+ is already
in M since we extended M only by bodies. Assume, then, that d+ is a body. Then
d+ has infinitely many copies inM, so we can choose d, a copy of d+ inM, such that
d 6∈ {a1, . . . , an}. Let α be any automorphism of M
+ which interchanges d and d+
and leaves every other element fixed. Then α(a1) = a1, . . . , α(an) = an and α(d
+) =
d. ByM+  φ(d+, a1, . . . , an), we have thatM
+  φ(α(d+), α(a1), . . . , α(an)). Thus
M
+  φ(d, a1, . . . , an) as required.
To prove that SPRB ,IOb does not imply SPRM or SPR
+, let M be any model of
SPRB ,IOb and AxExt containing at least two inertial observers k and h and a body
b for which wlinek(b) = {(0, 0, 0, t) : t ∈ Q} 6= wlineh(b). Such models exist, see,
e.g., (Sze´kely, 2013). Duplicating body b leads to a model in which SPRB ,IOb is
still satisfied since duplicating a body does not change the possible worldlines but
it violates both SPRM (the automorphism taking one inertial observer to another
cannot take a body having only one copy to one having two) and SPR+ (since
scenario ϕ(m) ≡ (∀b, c)[wlinem(b) = wlinem(c) = {(0, 0, 0, t) : t ∈ Q} → b = c]
holds for h but does not hold for k). 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. SPRM =⇒M  SPR
+.
Suppose SPRM, so that for any observers k and h there is an automorphism
α ∈ Aut(M) such that α(k) = h and α leaves elements of all sorts of L representing
mathematical objects fixed.
We will prove that AllAgree〈φ〉 holds for all φ ∈ Scenarios, i.e. given any observers
k and h, any scenario φ, and any set x¯ of parameters for φ, we have
φ(k, x¯)↔ φ(h, x¯). (1)
To prove this, choose some α ∈ Aut(M) which fixes Q and all the other sorts
representing mathematical objects, and satisfies α(k) = h.
Suppose M  φ(k, x¯). Since α is an automorphism, φ(α(k), α(x¯)) also holds in
M. But α(k) = h and α(x¯) = x¯, so this says that M  φ(h, x¯). Conversely, if φ(h, x¯)
holds in M, then so does φ(k, x¯), by symmetry. 
Proof of Theorem 7.3. SPRM =⇒M  SPRB ,IOb.
Suppose SPRM. Then (∀k, h)(∃α ∈ Aut(M))[α(k) = h∧α↾Q = IdQ]. We wish to
prove that M satisfies
SPRIOb ≡ (∀k, k
′)(∀h)(∃h′)[wkh = wk′h′ ],
SPRB ≡ (∀k, k
′)(∀b)(∃b′)[wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b
′)].
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Recall that whenever α is an automorphism ofM and R is a defined n-ary relation
on M, we have
R(v1, . . . , vn)⇐⇒ R(α(v1), . . . , α(vn)). (2)
Proof of SPRIOb . Choose any k, k
′, h. We need to find h′ such that wkh = wk′h′ ,
so let α ∈ Aut(M) be some automorphism taking k to k′, and define h′ = α(h). Now
it’s enough to note that wkh(p, q) is a defined 10-ary relation on M (one parameter
each for k and h, 4 each for p and q), so that
wkh(p, q)⇐⇒ wα(k)α(h)(α(p), α(q))
holds for all p, q, by (2). Substituting α(k) = k′, α(h) = h′, and noting that α leaves
all spacetime coordinates fixed (because α↾Q = IdQ) now gives
wkh(p, q)⇐⇒ wk′h′(p, q)
as required.
Proof of SPRB . Choose any k, k
′ and b. We need to find b′ such that wlinek(b) =
wlinek′(b
′). As before, let α ∈ Aut(M) be some automorphism taking k to k′, define
b′ = α(b), and note that “p ∈ wlinek(b)” is a defined 6-ary relation on M. Applying
(2) now tells us that
wlinek(b) = wlineα(k)(α(b)) = wlinek′(b
′)
as required. 
Proof of Theorem 7.4. SPR+ ∪ {AxId,AxEv,AxIB,AxField}  SPRB ,IOb.
This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5. and 7.6. 
Proof of Theorem 7.5. SPR(ψ, ψ˜) ∪ {AxId,AxEv}  SPRIOb for some ψ, ψ˜.
Given a 5-tuple of locations ~xi = (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4), let match (see Fig. 6) be the
relation
match(h, k, ~xi) ≡ (∀i ∈ {0, . . . , 4})(evh(ei) = evk(xi))
and define ψ, ψ˜ ∈ Scenarios by
ψ(k, p, q, ~xi) ≡ (∃h)[(evh(p) = evk(q)) ∧match(h, k, ~xi)],
ψ˜(k, p, q, ~xi) ≡ (∃h)[(evh(p) 6= evk(q)) ∧match(h, k, ~xi)].
Choose any k, h, k′. In order to establish SPRIOb we need to demonstrate some
h′ such that wkh = wk′h′ . To do this, let xi be such that evk(xi) = evh(ei) for all
i = 0, . . . , 4 (these exist by AxEv).
Then, in particular, ψ(k, e0, x0, ~xi) ≡ (∃h)[(evh(e0) = evk(x0)) ∧match(h, k, ~xi)]
holds. Since SPR(ψ, ψ˜), it follows that ψ(k′, e0, x0, ~xi) also holds, so there is some
h′ satisfying
match(h′, k′, ~xi). (3)
Now choose any p and q. We will show that evh(p) = evk(q) if and only if
evh′(p) = evk′(q), whence wkh = wk′h′ , as claimed.
Case 1: Suppose evh(p) = evk(q). In this case, ψ(k, p, q, ~xi) holds, and we need
to prove that evh′(p) = evk′ (q). It follows from SPR(ψ, ψ˜) that ψ(k
′, p, q, ~xi) also
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Fig. 6. Schematic showing the behaviour of function match, which tells us which
locations in k’s worldview correspond to the principle locations in h’s worldview.
holds, i.e. there exists h′′ satisfying
(evh′′(p) = evk′(q)) ∧match(h
′′, k′, ~xi). (4)
It follows from (3) that
match(h′, k′, ~xi) ∧match(h
′′, k′, ~xi)
holds, i.e.
evh′(ei) = evk′ (xi) = evh′′(ei)
holds for all i = 0, . . . , 4. By AxId it follows that (∀r)(evh′(r) = evh′′(r)).
It now follows from (4) that
evh′(p) = evh′′(p) = evk′(q),
i.e. evh′(p) = evk′ (q), as required.
Case 2: Suppose evh(p) 6= evk(q). In this case, ψ˜(k, p, q, ~xi) holds, and we need
to prove that evh′(p) 6= evk′ (q). It follows from SPR(ψ, ψ˜) that ψ˜(k
′, p, q, ~xi) also
holds, i.e. there exists h′′ satisfying
(evh′′(p) 6= evk′(q)) ∧match(h
′′, k′, ~xi). (5)
As before, it follows from (3) that evh′(ei) = evk′ (xi) = evh′′(ei) holds for all
i = 0, . . . , 4, and hence by AxId that (∀r)(evh′(r) = evh′′(r)).
It now follows from (5) that
evh′(p) = evh′′(p) 6= evk′(q),
i.e. evh′(p) 6= evk′ (q), as required. 
Proof of Theorem 7.6. SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxIB,AxField}  SPRB for some ξ.
We define ξ ∈ Scenarios by ξ(k, p, q) ≡ (∃b)(p, q ∈ wlinek(b)).
To see that this satisfies the theorem, suppose that AxIB and AxField both hold,
and choose any k, k′ ∈ IOb and any b ∈ B . We will demonstrate a body b′ satisfying
wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b
′), whence SPRB holds, as claimed.
According to AxIB, there exist points pk, qk ∈ Q
4, where qk 6= e0, and
wlinek(b) = {pk + λqk : λ ∈ Q}.
In particular, therefore, the points p = pk and q = pk + qk are distinct elements of
the straight line wlinek(b).
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This choice of p and q ensures that the statement ξ(k, p, q) holds. By SPR(ξ),
it follows that ξ(k′, p, q) also holds; i.e. there is some body b′ such that p, q ∈
wlinek′(b
′). By AxIB, wlinek′(b
′) is also a straight line.
It follows that wlinek(b) and wlinek′ (b
′) are both straight lines containing the
same two distinct points p and q. Since there can be at most one such line (by
AxField) it follows that wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b
′), as claimed. 
Proof of Theorem 7.7. If L = L0, then M  SPRB ,IOb ∪ {AxEv,AxExt} =⇒
SPRM.
Choose any k, k′. We need to demonstrate an automorphism α ∈ Aut(M) which
is the identity on Q and satisfies α(k) = k′.
• Action of α on IOb: Suppose h ∈ IOb. According to SPRIOb , there exists
some h′ such that wkh = wk′h′ . By Lemma 9.12., this h
′ is uniquely defined
(since we would otherwise have distinct h′, h′′ satisfying wk′h′ = wk′h′′). Define
α(h) = h′.
• Action of α on B : Suppose b ∈ B . According to SPRB , there exists some b
′
such that wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b
′). By AxExtB, this b′ is uniquely defined. Define
α(b) = b′.
• Action on Q : Define α↾Q = IdQ. Notice that this forces α(p) = p for all
p ∈ Q4.
We already know that α fixes Q . It remains only to prove that α ∈ Aut(M), and
that α(k) = k′.
Proof that α(k) = k′: Recall first that for any equivalence relation R, it is the
case that R = R ◦R−1, and that given any k, k′, k′′, we have
• wkk is an equivalence relation;
• w−1kk′ = wk′k; and
• wkk′ ◦ wk′k′′ = wkk′′ (by AxEv and (w.def)).
By construction, we have wkk = wk′α(k), whence wk′α(k) is an equivalence relation.
It now follows that
wk′α(k) = wk′α(k) ◦ w
−1
k′α(k)
= wk′α(k) ◦ wα(k)k′
= wk′k′ .
and hence, by Lemma 9.12., that α(k) = k′, as required.
Proof that α ∈ Aut(M): We know that wlinek(b) = wlinek′(α(b)) = wlineα(k)(α(b)),
or in other words, given any b and q ∈ Q4,
b ∈ evk(q)⇐⇒ α(b) ∈ evα(k)(q). (6)
We wish to proveW(h, b, p)↔W(α(h), α(b), p) for all h, b and p (recall that α(p) =
p). This is equivalent to proving
b ∈ evh(p)⇐⇒ α(b) ∈ evα(h)(p). (7)
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Choose any h, b, p. Let q ∈ Q4 satisfy evk(q) = evh(p) – such a q exists by AxEv.
Then
evα(k)(q) = evα(h)(p) (8)
because wkh = wk′α(h) = wα(k)α(h) by the definition of α(h) and the fact, established
above, that k′ = α(k).
To prove (7), let us first assume that b ∈ evh(p). Then b ∈ evk(q), so α(b) ∈
evα(k)(q) by (6). Then, by (8) we have α(b) ∈ evα(h)(p). Next, choose b 6∈ evh(p) =
evk(q). Then α(b) 6∈ evα(k)(q) = evα(h)(p) by (6) and (8). It follows that b ∈
evh(p)⇐⇒ α(b) ∈ evα(k)(q), as required.
It remains to show that α is a bijection.
Proof of injection:
• Observers : Suppose α(h) = α(h′). Then, by the definition of α, we have
wkh = wk′α(h) = wk′α(h′) = wkh′
and now h = h′ by Lemma 9.12.
• Bodies : Suppose α(b) = α(c). By definition of α we have
wlinek(b) = wlinek′ (α(b)) = wlinek′(α(c)) = wlinek(c)
and now b = c follows by AxExtB.
Proof of surjection: We need for every h′, b′ that there are h, b satisfying α(h) = h′
and α(b) = b′.
• Observers : Let h′ ∈ IOb. By SPRIOb there exists h such that wk′h′ = wkh,
and now h′ = α(h) for any such h.
• Bodies : Let b′ ∈ B . By SPRB there exists b ∈ B such that wlinek′(b
′) =
wlinek(b), and now b
′ = α(b) for any such b.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 8.8. (wlDefM and M  SPR
+) =⇒ M  SPRB .
Assume M  SPR+ and wlDefM. Choose any k, k
′ ∈ IOb and any b ∈ B . We will
demonstrate a body b′ satisfying wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b
′).
Let ϕ(y¯, x¯) ≡ ϕ(y1, y2, y3, y4, x1, . . . , xn) be a formula such that all the free
variables y¯, x¯ of ϕ are of sort Q , and choose a¯ ∈ Qn such that
wlinek(b) ≡ {q ∈ Q
4 : M  ϕ(q, a¯)},
Such ϕ and a¯ exist by wlDefM.
We define ψ ∈ Scenarios by ψ(h, x¯) ≡ (∃c)(∀q)[q ∈ wlineh(c) ↔ ϕ(q, x¯)]. Clearly,
M  ψ(k, a¯). Then, by SPR+, M  ψ(k′, a¯). Thus, there is b′ ∈ B such that
wlinek′(b
′) ≡ {q ∈ Q4 : M  ϕ(q, a¯)}, and wlinek(b) = wlinek′(b
′) for this b′. 
Proof of Theorem 8.9. (wlDefM and M  SPR
+ ∪ {AxId,AxEv}) =⇒
M  SPRB ,IOb.
This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5. and 8.8. 
Proof of Theorem 8.10. SPR+ ∪ {AxId,AxEv,AxWl(n)}  SPRB ,IOb.
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This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 7.5. and 8.11. 
Proof of Theorem 8.11. SPR(ξ) ∪ {AxWl(n)}  SPRB for some ξ.
We define ξ ∈ Scenarios by ξ(k, p1, . . . , pn) ≡ (∃b)(p1, . . . , pn ∈ wlinek(b)). It is
easy to check that ξ satisfies the theorem, and we omit the details. 
§10. Discussion and Conclusions In this paper we have shown formally that
adopting different viewpoints can lead to different, but equally ‘natural’, formalisa-
tions of the special principle of relativity. The idea that different formalisations exist
is, of course, not new, but the advantage of our approach is that we can investigate
the formal relationships between different formalisations, and deduce the conditions
under which equivalence can be restored.
We have shown, in particular, that the model-based interpretation of the princi-
ple, SPRM, is strictly stronger than the alternatives SPR
+ and SPRB ,IOb , and have
identified various counterexamples to show that the three approaches are not, in
general equivalent. On the other hand, equivalence is restored in the presence of
various axioms. We note, however, that the following question remains open, since
it is unclear whether SPR+ is enough, in its own right, to entail SPRB ,IOb .
Conjecture 10.13. SPR+ 6=⇒ SPRB .
An interesting direction for future research would be to investigate the extent
to which our existing results can be strengthened by removing auxiliary axioms.
For example, our proof that SPRM can be recovered from SPR
+ currently relies on
L = L0, AxId, AxIB, AxField, AxEv and AxExt. While we know that some additional
axiom(s) must be required (since we have presented a counterexample showing
that SPR+ 6=⇒ SPRM), the question remains whether we can develop a proof that
works over any language, L, or whether the constraint L = L0 is required. Again,
assuming we allow the same auxiliary axioms, how far can we minimise the set S
of scenarios while still entailing the equivalence between SPR(S) and SPRM?
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